Last week, fellow-blogger and long-time Japan resident Curzon posted a somewhat frustrated entry on the much-heralded “Japanese military build-up.” In a reply to his post, this author indicated that while the total numeric figure for defense spending will be reduced in the FY05 budget, spending within the military budget itself will most likely be shifted.
SDF compositional changes detailed in last Friday’s release of Japan’s five-year National Defense Program Outline, and the concurrent announcement by Cabinet Secretary Hosoda that the long-standing “3 Principles on Weapons Export” would be loosened, allowing Japanese firms to export missile defense components to the United States, seems to confirm this spending shift.
Which brings us back to the original topic – Japan’s defense buildup – and Curzon’s original question: “Is Japan remilitarizing or not?”
Consider the following commentary by a “political expert in Seoul “, which appeared in yesterday’s Korea Herald, and is rather typical in its attitude toward Japan:
[T]his kind of defense buildup by Japan will trigger competitiveness among regional players, thus leading to an arms race which of course brings tension in the region…An arms expansion is suicidal for everyone - Japan, China, North Korea and especially South Korea, centered between all of them.
But to exactly what defense buildup is he referring? The problem is, aside from cooperating with the United States on a missile defense system (which admittedly could be used for offensive purposes, though it’s difficult to imagine a case where this might occur) trouble remains in determining where the so-called “build-up” is taking place.
In fact, Japan is actually downsizing the size of the SDF, shrinking the number of soldiers in the GSDF by 5,000, from 160,000 to 150,000. The number of tanks will also be reduced to 600 from 900, as will the number of main artillery.
Still, Japan, and certain current and former Koizumi administration cabinet officials, are indeed more openly adopting an aggressive and often hawkish stance. With the release of the Defense Outline, the extension of the SDF dispatch in Samawah, and the relaxation of weapons exports, last week was unquestionably a good one for LDP hardliners. But does all of this amount to a military build-up, or simply more military activity?
Let us start with the facts and first turn to the defense outline itself, which has the following to say concerning the justification for what is being hailed as the “build-up”:
Given the new security environment, the future defense force should be capable of effectively responding to the new threats and various situation while elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept preserving valid [sic]…
Fair enough. Some of the old threats still remain, and it’s a hard argument to make that the security environment hasn’t changed much since 1996, when Japan released its last defense outline. And the outline does make specific mention of this:
…unpredictability and uncertainty still remain in the situation on the Korean Peninsula as well as the Taiwan Straits. North Korea is developing, deploying, and proliferating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and maintains a large number of special operations forces…in addition, China, which has strong influence on the security in this region, has been modernizing its nuclear and missile capabilities as well as navel and air forces, and expanding its area of operation at sea.
Leaving aside the controversy over whether it was wise or not to mention potential threats by name, all of these claims are rather hard assertions to refute.
Consider North Korea. Since the last defense guidelines were issued, Pyongyang has withdrawn from the NNPT, admitted to having a secretive program attempting to process HEU, kicked out IAEA inspectors and began reprocessing spend nuclear fuel, test-launched two missiles which flew over or landed near Japan, and admitted to the abduction of at least13 Japanese civilians. (As a side note, the degree of public anger over the abductee issue is truly amazing.)
As for China, one can’t help but wonder if that last barb was added at the last minute. Sure it might have only been a Han-class rust bucket, but the recent submarine scandal has left the Japanese somewhat sore. The Chinese make no attempts to conceal their own military build-up, though much of this likely relates to Taiwan, and they seem rather excited of the prospect of the EU lifting the arms embargo imposed after Tiananmen.
But the question is, do the above conditions necessitate a change in Japan’s national defense structure? Assume for a moment that they do (because this seems to be exactly what the GOJ is presently assuming) and it’s only natural that Japan should rework its thinking on national security. After all, the current defense structure was envisioned with a Soviet invasion force in mind (nevermind that the Soviets would never have bothered invading anyway, because a nuking Japan would have been a much easier option). That being said, the new outline specifically calls for the following changes (paraphrased from the original):
1) The introduction of a ballistic missile defense system. This in combination with the US nuclear deterrent should effectively deal with any nuclear threats to Japan.
2) Enhance the readiness and mobility of defense force units, allowing them to respond more effectively to attacks from guerrilla or special operations forces.
The outline goes on to say:
Japan will try to deal effectively with the new threats and various situations by developing and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations…
Looking at the figures in the appendix, these recommendations are reflected in the creation of a “Central Quick-Reaction Group” in the GSDF, the inclusion of figures for the Ballistic Missile Defense Force (which are somewhat confusingly also included in the MSDF and ASDF figures), and finally the addition of mid-air refueling aircraft.
So, those are the facts of the matter. Although the content of the outline alone is little cause for concern, it must be considered in the context of a larger series of events recently affecting the Japanese military and its presence in the world. And of course, there’s always the history issue. The confluence of these factors appears to be what is generating fears over a remilitarizing Japan.
A number of questions and problems remain to be addressed. Whether or not a more active Japanese military is a good thing or not, suffice it to say for the time being that like it or not, it seems as though that is what the world is going to get. Whether Japan actually needs this stronger military reamains to be seen. Given rising fears of North Korea, the missile defense project might be argued as necessary, but is there much need to go further than that at the moment?
It probably wasn't the best of ideas to mention the Chinese by name in the report as for the time being it's difficult to imagine them posing a real military threat to Japan. This is certainly going to make the Chinese jumpier than they need be, and in their minds this won't be without good reason. After all, in all of history (excluding the Mongols, which Han Chinese would hardly claim as their own) China has never invaded Japan, but Japan has invaded China several times in the last 100 years.
# posted by Saru : 11:19 AM
: 8:22 PM